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RURAL-URBAN POVERTY DIFFERENCES IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES 
 
1. Introduction 
Much has been written about the transition process that occurred in the former centrally planned 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The economic collapse, 
privatization and the transformation processes in industry and services, the effects of EU 
accession, and the post-1998 recovery, all have received considerable attention (e.g. Blanchard, 
1997; Roland, 2000; Svejnar 2002). A relatively large literature has also emerged on the changes 
and transformation of the agricultural sector and their consequences for output and productivity 
(see Rozelle and Swinnen (2004) for a survey of this literature).  
 Interestingly  however,  little  is known about how all these changes have affected welfare, 
and in particular poverty, in rural areas. While development scholars and policy makers have 
long had a strong interest in poverty differences between rural and urban areas, information on 
transition countries is mostly limited to anecdotal evidence and a few country-specific analyses 
(e.g. Seeth et al., 1998; Cord et al., 2003).  There is – to our knowledge – no comparative 
analysis that allows broadening our understanding of the effects of transition on rural poverty. 
Moreover, while the adverse effects of transition on health and social indicators have received 
considerable attention (see e.g. Jensen and Richter, 2004; Brainerd and Cutler, 2005), little is 
known about the differences between rural and urban areas, and the relationship of these factors 
with income poverty.  
This gap in attention is striking for two reasons.  First, a large share of the population in 
transition countries lives and works in rural areas and the share is largest in the poorest countries.  
For example, in Central Asia and part of the Balkan countries, more than 50% of the people live 
in rural areas (WDI, 2005).  In all transition countries more than 25% of the population is rural. 
An even larger share of the poor lives in rural areas.  Rural areas in the region, as in most of the 
rest of the world, have a disproportionate share of poor households.  Only in a few countries is 
poverty risk less in rural than in urban areas.   
  Second, and remarkably, the lack of attention to rural poverty is most striking in those 
countries where transition caused an increase in rural poverty, and often dramatically so.  Studies 
of rural poverty during transition have focused mostly on China and Vietnam where rural   2
poverty declined strongly (Ravallion and Chen, 2004; Ravallion and van de Walle, 2004). Rural 
poverty in the transition countries in Europe and Central Asia has not received much attention.  
The first objective of this paper is to address this gap by taking advantage of a new 
dataset that allows comparing urban and rural poverty in 23 transition countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, henceforth referred to in short as the “transition 
countries”.
1 The paper analyzes how poverty in rural areas in these transition countries compares 
to urban poverty and how the rural-urban poverty differences have changed over time.
2   
Key findings on rural poverty and its relationship with urban poverty are, first, that there 
are major differences in rural poverty across the transition countries.  Second, rural poverty is 
generally higher than urban poverty.  Third, the difference between rural and urban poverty 
differs strongly across countries.  Fourth, rural and urban poverty largely moved in the same 
direction since 1998.  Fifth, while both rural and urban poverty declined significantly after 1998, 
rural poverty is not catching up and therefore grows in relative importance.  
The second objective of this paper is to provide a set of hypotheses to explain the factors 
and processes underlying rural-urban poverty differences in the transition countries.  For this, we 
use a conceptual framework in which poverty levels depend on households’ asset endowment, 
the returns to those assets, as well as transfers, and discuss how different developments before 
and after 1998 have affected these three factors.  First, we argue that to understand the current 
differences in rural poverty, it is crucial to understand the differences in the levels of rural and 
urban poverty - and their possible causes - in the 1990s. The impact of the most important reform 
policies affecting the rural areas - in particular land privatization, agricultural price and trade 
liberalization, and farm restructuring - largely occurred before 1998. Second, we explain how 
both differences in reform policies and in initial structural conditions can help explain the 
heterogeneity in rural poverty outcomes across countries.
3 Differences in land reform and farm 
restructuring, and the migration patterns triggered by those, can help explain why the rural-urban 
poverty gap is higher in some countries than in others.  Differences in human capital and rural 
infrastructure and services also play a role. Third, concerning the developments after 1998, we 
emphasize the diverging price developments after the financial crisis, and robust economic 
growth, that translated into wage increases, infrastructure investment, and public transfers.  
In this paper we do not test these hypotheses econometrically because of data constraints. 
Indeed, comparable poverty data to analyze the pre-1998 changes, which we argue to be key in   3
this paper, are not available. While the available post-1998 data allow for a rich description of 
rural and urban poverty in the region, the relatively short time period covered, and the lack of 
(exogenous) variation because of largely parallel developments, do not allow for an insightful or 
rigorous econometric analysis. Instead, this paper aims to provide a comparative analysis to shed 
light on a set of hypotheses. Future micro-level studies that take advantage of some of the natural 
experiments that the transition context offers, might allow testing these or related hypotheses, 
and uncover the possible causal relationships of the observed patterns.
4 The contribution of this 
paper is hence to provide a comparative and dynamic analysis that can help to place and interpret 
such micro-level findings within a broader framework.  
For the same reason, the policy discussion focuses on the structural differences between 
rural and urban areas that have arisen during the process of transition, and what this implies for 
policy. The paper also draws attention to the differences among different groups of countries that 
would need to be accounted for in policy design. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the data and our general approach. 
Section 3 describes differences between rural and urban poverty and the changes that occurred 
since 1998. In section 4, we present a conceptual framework and section 5 discusses how the pre-
1998 reforms affected key household assets (land and human capital), the returns to these asset 
endowments, and the importance of public and private transfers. Section 6 discusses how these 
factors were affected by post-1998 developments. In section 7, we then put the different pieces 
together and identify several patterns in rural and urban poverty dynamics. Section 8 concludes 
with policy implications.  
 
2.  Data, Methodology, and Approach 
This paper relies on new comparable data of poverty in transition countries that were calculated 
by the World Bank based on household level surveys (Alam et al., 2005). Income poverty is 
measured as the number of rural households with incomes (or more specifically consumption) 
levels below the international poverty line, i.e. the poverty headcount. The calculation of the 
head count indices (P0) are based on a common absolute poverty line of 2.15$ a day in 2000PPP 
for all countries and years. Adjustments for within-country price differences allow comparing 
rural and urban areas.
5  Since head count ratios are calculated based on separate household 
surveys for each country, there might be some remaining comparability issues related to   4
differences in questionnaires and survey method. Moreover, quantitative analysis necessarily is 
constrained to years and countries with data availability. Similar availability and comparability 
issues are relevant for variables capturing non-income dimensions of poverty.  
Nevertheless, this new dataset constitutes the most carefully constructed and 
comprehensive source on rural poverty in transition countries to date. Because we focus our 
analysis on rural-urban differences, rather than levels of rural poverty per se, the concerns related 
to comparability across countries are further reduced (as differences resulting from country 
specific fixed factors cancel out).
6 We also present alternative rural-urban indicators based on 
national poverty lines, and discuss the robustness of the observed trends.   
  As poverty defined on household consumption only provides a partial measurement of 
welfare, we also consider infant mortality. Health-related indicators are important given the 
declines of social services in the region. Infant mortality is used, as it is one of the only 
comparable indicators available across countries, and is a benchmark indicator for the 
Millennium Development Goals. Some evidence suggests however that infant mortality might be 
underestimated in the region, particularly in the CIS (Aleshina and Redmond, 2003). Given that 
the rural-urban differences by country control for differences in classification and registration 
practices, the relative measure should be more reliable. Yet, Buckley (1998) suggests for Central 
Asia that infant mortality might be less likely to be registered in rural areas than in urban. For 
these reasons, we only discuss general patterns in rural-urban infant mortality differences and 
focus most of the dynamic analysis on income poverty. 
For both conceptual and practical reasons, we split up the analysis of income poverty in a 
pre-1998 and a post-1998 period.  Practically, the comparative time-series data on rural poverty 
only start in 1998.  Hence, we consider rural and urban poverty levels, and changes in rural and 
urban poverty in the five-year period after 1998.  Conceptually, there are also good reasons to 
separate the analysis in a pre-1998 and post-1998 period.  The year 1998 is broadly considered a 
turning year for transition. The pre-1998 period was characterized by the fundamental economic 
changes related to the move from plan to market, and the massive – unanticipated - economic 
collapse in which it resulted. Trends were reversed after 1998, as the Ruble crisis and the 
economic recovery after deflation in Russia, as well as the maturation of the market system and 
the incentives related to EU accession, provided a strong impetus for economic growth (Alam et 
al., 2005).    5
 
3.  Observations on Rural and Urban Poverty 
3.1. Rural poverty and rural-urban differences 
There is enormous variation in rural poverty across the transition countries. Rural headcount 
ratios, based on 2000 PPP, range from less than 1 % in Hungary to almost 80 % in Kyrgyzstan in 
2002 (table 1). Absolute poverty levels largely correspond to income levels. Poverty is high in 
Central Asia and the Trans-Caucasus and lowest in Central Europe.
7   
(Table 1 here) 
Income poverty in rural areas is significantly higher than in urban areas in the vast 
majority of transition countries (table 1). Rural versus urban poverty indicators from other 
sources, be it poverty headcount ratios using national poverty lines, or poverty incidence ratios 
based on relative shares in the poorest quintile, also show that for the vast majority of transition 
countries rural poverty is much higher than urban poverty.   
Intriguingly, several of the countries with the largest rural-urban differences are Eastern 
European EU accession countries. Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria have the highest 
differences between rural and urban poverty risks.  The differences are also very high for Russia 
and Kazakhstan. In those countries the ratio of rural on urban headcount is higher than 1.5, 
meaning that poverty risk is more than 50% higher in rural than in urban areas.
8 In contrast, rural 
poverty is lower than urban in Belarus and in two Trans-Caucasian countries (Armenia and 
Azerbaijan), and this finding is consistent across years and indicators.
9 Rural and urban poverty 
are about the same in Bosnia&Herzegovina, Macedonia, Tajikistan, Hungary and Estonia.  
Non-income poverty indicators shed further light on rural welfare and rural-urban 
differences (last 2 columns of table 1). In terms of levels, infant mortality in rural areas is highest 
in Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, and in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan).  In 
all these countries the infant mortality rate was more than 15 deaths per 1000 live births in 2002. 
Infant mortality is lower in the Trans-Caucasus and in richer Central and Eastern European 
countries.   
In terms of rural-urban differences a more mixed picture emerges than for income 
poverty.  Infant mortality in rural areas is higher than in urban areas in 40% of the countries (e.g. 
Russia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania); about the same in 30% (e.g. Central 
Europe, Moldova and Ukraine), and lower in the remaining 30% (e.g. Armenia, Georgia,   6
Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan).  Yet, as for income poverty, there exists a 
broad contrast in rural-urban differences between high disparities in the poorer EU accession 
countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania), versus smaller (and even positive) rural-urban 
differences in the Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia. This further motivates our focus on income 
poverty.  
3.2. Recent changes in rural and urban poverty  
Figure 1 summarizes the available time-series data on the evolution of income poverty over the 
1998-2002 period. The first panel depicts the unweighted average for the countries for which 
data is available for the same years, i.e. Moldova, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Belarus, Lithuania, 
Hungary and Poland. The next panel shows averages weighted by population in 2000.  These 
figures indicate that immediately following the 1998 crisis, rural poverty increased strongly in 
the region.  After 1999, when growth started in many countries, average rural poverty in the 
region declined substantially for the subset of countries with time-series data.  The largest 
poverty reductions occurred in middle and low-income CIS countries, with the important 
exceptions of Armenia and Georgia. Poverty levels in EU accession countries, where they started 
from relatively low levels, stayed relatively stable.
10 
(Figure 1 here) 
  Rural and urban poverty changes followed similar trends over the 1998-2002 period 
(figure 1). This is true also for the trends in the individual countries with time series data (see 
figure A1 in the appendix). As a result, the gap between rural and urban poverty, which on 
average was around 5 percentage points, has remained remarkably stable.
11 Rural poverty 
declined approximately at the same rate as urban poverty, but not faster (figure 2).
12 Exceptions 
are Moldova and Azerbaijan, where rural poverty reduction was stronger than urban. 
(Figure 2 here) 
Notice that, as a result of these broadly parallel developments, the ratio of rural to urban 
poverty, while remaining more or less constant in low-income countries, has increased strongly 
in the middle-income countries (figure A2 in the appendix).
13  There continues to be more 
poverty in rural areas, and if trends witnessed since 1998 continue, the share of rural poverty in 
total poverty will further increase in the future.  
In the rest of this paper we try to explain both the general trends and the heterogeneity in 
the rural-urban poverty differences.  To start we present a conceptual framework for the analysis.    7
 
4.  Conceptual Framework 
As documented above, the ratio of rural versus urban poverty levels differs dramatically across 
countries.  However changes in rural poverty since 1998 look remarkable similar to changes in 
urban poverty in most countries.  This indicates that the current differences in the gaps between 
rural and urban poverty across countries are not due to changes over recent years, but to 
developments in the pre-1998 period and to long-run structural conditions. Hence, in order to 
understand the current poverty situation in rural areas, and the reasons for the divergence with 
urban poverty, it is essential to understand what happened with poverty before 1998.  
We start with a simple conceptual framework to explain how various factors have 
affected rural households’ consumption levels and, hence, rural poverty. Given market 
imperfections, rural households income and consumption decisions are jointly determined, and 
rural households’ consumption is a function of (1) their asset endowments (“assets”), (2) the 
returns to their assets, which are partly determined by the constraints and market failures the 
household face (“returns”), and (3) public and private transfers they receive (“transfers”).
14  
  Many changes in transition countries over the past fifteen years had major impacts on 
these three sets of factors. For example, rural households’ assets such as land and human capital 
were affected by land privatization and migration patterns. Returns to assets were affected by 
price and wage liberalization and by changes in efficiency through farm restructuring and 
property rights reforms, as well as (lack of) access to markets, services and infrastructure. 
Finally, the role of public and private transfers differed widely across countries.  While the post-
1998 period was characterized by substantial changes in returns to assets and transfers, most 
major changes occurred before 1998. This argument is consistent with the empirical observations 
that the main cross-country differences go back to the pre-1998 period. Section 5 therefore first 
provides a set of hypotheses that could explain the heterogeneity in rural-urban poverty 
differences in 1998. Section 6 returns to the changes that have taken place after 1998.   
(Figure 3 here) 
  In the analysis, “agricultural reforms” play an important role.  This is because agricultural 
reforms - in the broad sense, including changes in price, subsidy and trade policies; land reforms, 
farm restructuring, and privatization of food companies; liberalization of rural factor markets; 
etc. - have had a strong impact on the three sets of factors (assets, returns, and transfers) for   8
several reasons. First, agriculture is a major income source and employs a large share of the rural 
population in most transition countries, and especially so in the poorest countries.  For example, 
in several countries in South Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia agriculture accounts 
for more than 40% of rural income and employs 40% or more of the total work force – and a 
much higher share of the rural workforce (figure 3).  Second, in the countries where the share of 
agriculture in employment is (much) lower, the poorest are usually either directly or indirectly 
linked to agriculture, either because they are involved in subsistence farming and/or because they 
have been laid off by corporate farm organizations and have not been able to find alternative 
employment.
15  In some countries, agriculture has also absorbed many workers laid off in other 
sectors (Swinnen, Dries and Macours, 2005).  Third, collective and state farms were historically 
the suppliers of social services in rural areas, and continue to be so in some countries.  Access to 
rural services is therefore importantly related to the restructuring of the farms. 
 
5. Differences between Rural and Urban Poverty pre-1998 
5.1. Household asset endowments 
  As is well understood from studies in developing countries, access to land is particularly 
important for poor rural households (Binswanger et al, 1995; Deininger, 2003). In addition to 
land assets, we focus also on human capital assets, as household labor is arguably the one asset 
that all households have in common.  
Access to land: Land reforms shifted land property rights to rural households. The effects 
of land reforms on productivity gains and poverty reduction depend on changes in the overall 
returns to land, affected by prices, and imperfections in other input and output markets. The 
nature of the property rights reforms, and the importance of agriculture income in rural 
households income portfolios, also crucially condition their effects. These two factors differed 
drastically across transition countries (Leman et al, 2004; Swinnen, 1999).  
In most of Central and Eastern Europe, governments restituted land rights to former 
owners, many who had long moved out of the rural areas. In the larger CIS countries, land rights 
were distributed as shares to farm workers, which complicated access to land.   In many of the 
poorer transition countries, where labor-intensive agriculture is the key rural income source 
(including Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan), governments 
distributed land to rural households in physical plots.  It is striking that the latter countries have   9
relatively small (and sometimes positive) differences between urban and rural headcounts.  This 
suggests that physical land access might have helped mitigate rural poverty in these poorer and 
more agricultural based countries. This is consistent with the empirical evidence of productivity 
gains and poverty reduction of similar reforms in China (Lin, 1992; Ravallion and Chen, 2004) 
and Vietnam (Pingali and Xuan (1992); Ravallion and van de Walle, 2004). In Georgia, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan, distribution of land coincided with a strong and sudden 
increase of labor in the agricultural sector. Part of the labor inflow resulted from urban to rural 
migration. With industrial decline, deteriorating urban economic conditions and food insecurity, 
the best option available for many unemployed urban households might have been to move to the 
rural areas, where family members had obtained access to land (Macours and Swinnen, 2005).  
Human Capital: Human capital endowments and household structures differ substantially 
between urban and rural areas. Table 2 shows that rural households tend to have lower levels of 
education in all countries. Education of the household head is likely to be an important 
determinant of poverty in the region.
16 Inadequate human capital not only constrains 
employment and agricultural restructuring, but more generally business development in rural 
areas. Indeed, figure 3 shows that income from non-agricultural self-employment is relatively 
limited. Djankov et al. (2005) show that education is positively correlated with entrepreneurship 
in transition countries. Rizov and Swinnen (2004) confirm the importance of education for 
business-start up and enterprise efficiency, but also show that beyond a certain level of education 
individuals tend to leave agriculture and choose for non-agricultural employment.  
(Table 2 here) 
Absolute levels of education are higher on average in the CIS countries, which could help 
the rural population both in agricultural and non-agricultural income generation. However, one 
should be careful with such conclusions since there may be a mismatch between earlier 
education and what is required for finding employment in the restructured economies.
17   
The human capital disadvantage of rural areas is exacerbated in the European CIS 
(Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine) and in Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Romania by the 
considerably higher share of elderly in rural than in urban areas (table 2). In most of these 
countries there is evidence of rural-to-urban migration by younger cohorts. Young and dynamic 
people left the rural areas in search for better opportunities in the urban areas, and often abroad, 
reinforcing the share of older, low skilled and less educated people in rural areas. In addition, in   10
some countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, the rural-urban bias in age distribution was 
reinforced by urban-to-rural migration of elderly after land restitution. Land restitution 
concentrated land ownership in older households who used their land for subsistence farming 
with low pensions.   
The unfavorable age distribution is likely to have a negative effect on aggregate rural 
growth and poverty reduction, even if at the level of the household, the presence of a pensioner 
in the family (because of pension income) might actually decrease poverty risk. This depends, 
however, strongly on the level of pensions, which is typically low in the poorer countries. In 
contrast to the unfavorable age distribution of rural areas in most transition countries, the share 
of the young and active population is relatively high in the Trans-Caucasus where rural poverty 
is less than urban poverty.  
 
5.2. Returns to household assets 
Prices: Almost all transition countries introduced price and trade liberalization, often coinciding 
with macro-economic reforms, in the early years of transition.
18 The result was major reductions 
in support to agriculture and in food consumption subsidies. Reduced domestic demand with 
falling incomes and subsidy cuts was reinforced by falling foreign demand and increased import 
competition with trade liberalization.  Agricultural terms of trade declined dramatically, i.e., 
between 40 and 77% (see figure 4). In marked contrast with the developments in China where 
land reforms coincided with increases in agricultural prices in the early years of transition, these 
price developments offset benefits from the land reforms, and explain a large part of the initial 
output declines.
19  They likely contributed to the decline of rural incomes and an increase of rural 
poverty. Similar subsidy cuts and price declines affected other industries, but liberalizations also 
resulted in increased returns for (some) services. 
(Figure 4 here) 
    Farm productivity and efficiency: Privatization and farm restructuring had two opposing 
effects on farm productivity. They initially caused production disruptions and in some cases 
reinforced output declines and income falls (Macours and Swinnen, 2000), but the reforms were 
also instrumental for long-term efficiency increases and afterwards became sources of growth 
(Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004).  The importance of these two offsetting effects is hence related to 
the timing of the reforms and the stage of transition. They further depend on the labor-intensity   11
of the agricultural production, which differed drastically across countries. Where agricultural 
production was labor-intensive, efficiency gains were strongest for small-scale family farms, as 
labor monitoring costs make large-scale operations less competitive. We expect this to have 
translated directly into rural poverty reduction. Vice versa, in countries that had already more 
capital-intensive technologies, larger-scale farms often maintained a competitive advantage 
because of better access to credit, input and output markets. In those more capital-intensive 
countries the impacts of household farming on rural poverty were therefore likely to be more 
muted. Moreover, where large-scale farm organizations continued to operate, they needed to lay 
off surplus labor in response to hardened budget constraints.
20 Where large-scale organizations 
were effectively restructured, such as in Central Europe, efficiency gains contributed 
simultaneously to higher rural unemployment as well as higher incomes of those workers that 
remained employed on the farms.  These differential effects of farm restructuring and 
privatization are consistent with rural poverty reduction in the poorer, labor-intensive economies, 
such as in parts of Central Asia and the Trans-Caucasus, but opposite developments in countries 
with a more mechanized agricultural production system.   
  Access to services and infrastructure: With transition, accessing services became more 
difficult as supplies decreased and prices rose.  In a very real sense, rural villages became more 
“remote”. Access often became more difficult and travel more costly in terms of price, quality, 
and availability of transport. An important related problem in rural areas is poor access to 
information.  Interviews with rural households indicate that lack of information often constrained 
their business decisions and weakened their negotiation power versus traders and local 
authorities.  Poor information has also negatively affected households in the farm restructuring 
and land reform process (World Bank, 2004b). 
  Access to services and infrastructure in rural areas is worse than in urban areas in all 
countries, and in many countries much worse (table A2).  Rural services are relatively better in 
Central Europe, and are particularly poor in South East European countries such as Romania, 
Albania, and Moldova, and Central Asia.
21  While rural areas might have had less access to 
services even before 1990, service quality and availability often decreased during transition as 
high quality service providers migrated from the rural areas to the cities or abroad. Overall the 
lack of good services infrastructure, and access to markets, might strongly condition returns to 
household assets in both agricultural and non-agricultural activities.    12
 
5.3 Transfers and international migration 
Public transfers: Social transfers are an important income source in rural areas.  In contrast with 
the situation in many other developing countries, rural households in the region benefit from 
relatively large flows of social transfers, in particular pensions. Information from countries with 
disaggregate data suggests that the share of social transfers in income in the rural areas is not 
substantially less than in the urban areas, with the possible exceptions of Albania and Armenia. 
In fact, both the absolute and the relative level of income from pensions is higher in rural than in 
urban areas in, for example, Bulgaria, reflecting the differences in age distribution (see figure 3).  
Public transfers were particularly important in the higher-income countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe with relatively good social benefits and pensions, and few people employed in 
agriculture. These higher-income countries could afford to keep rural poverty - and urban-rural 
differences - low through social transfers, while at the same time benefiting from the 
productivity gains from reduction of excess employment in the restructured large-scale farm 
organizations (Macours and Swinnen, 2000). 
Private transfers: Remittances from international migration play a key role in the region. 
In absolute levels, international migration in the former Soviet Union alone accounts for 9% of 
worldwide migration, and for more than 20% of all South-South migration (Ratha and Shaw, 
2006).  International migration (both seasonal and permanent) and remittance flows are very 
strong in Albania (18% of GDP), Moldova (14% of GDP), and the former Yugoslav Republics 
(WDI, 2005). At the level of the rural household, this translates in average contributions of 
private transfers to rural income of 13 % in Albania, and 20 % in Kosovo. Migration, often by 
the young male adults in the households, is an important income diversification strategy in some 
countries, and probably contributes to mitigating rural poverty.  Yet net private transfers tend to 
be lower in rural than in urban areas (Figure 3).  This might partly reflect higher returns to 
international migration for urban households, because of higher skill levels and differences in 
migration patterns: seasonal migration for agricultural or construction work from rural areas, 
versus longer-term migration from urban areas.
22  
    13
5.4.  Summary  
By 1998, rural poverty was higher than urban poverty in most countries. This can be explained 
by the combination of price and trade liberalization, deterioration of social services and 
infrastructure, and initial disadvantages in human capital endowments that were further 
reinforced by the transition process. The magnitude of the gap between rural and urban poverty 
differed, however, widely across countries. These differences can be traced back to differences in 
population structure and economic development at the start of transition, the choices and 
outcomes of the different land privatization and farm restructuring processes and to differences 
in factor availability and technology. In Section 7, we integrate these various effects and their 
interactions to identify several “patterns of rural poverty dynamics”.  
 
6.  Rural versus Urban Poverty after 1998 
Since 1998 there have been important changes in rural and urban poverty, but these have been 
more similar across countries.  To explain the post-1998 changes we focus again on the three sets 
of factors (assets, returns, transfers) that condition household incomes and discuss how country- 
and region-specific developments in the post-1998 period have affected them.  
 
 
6.1. Household asset endowment 
Access to land: Land reform was completed in many countries by 1998. However in a few 
countries substantial changes still occurred afterwards. For example in Azerbaijan and Moldova, 
new land reforms started in 1996 and 1998, and land was distributed in kind to rural households 
during the following years, with gains emerging in the second half of the 1990s and later. As 
such these countries became the latest to follow the pattern of other labor-intensive rural 
transition economies. This induced important productivity and income gains in rural areas - as in 
other countries - and may be the main explanation why in Moldova, which was last to implement 
the new reforms, rural poverty declined stronger than urban poverty over the 1998-2002 period.
23  
Human capital: The human capital disadvantage persists in most of the rural areas across 
the region, and is further exacerbated by migration of the younger, more skilled, population from 
the rural areas. 
   14
6.2. Return to household assets 
Wages: Economic growth was robust in all countries, but there was considerable heterogeneity, 
with annual growth rates between 1999 and 2002 higher than 6% in Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, and less than 3% in the Czech Republic, 
Romania, and Slovakia (WDI, 2005). General wage improvements helped guarantee that the 
gains from growth were relatively equally distributed (Alam et al. 2005). This can help explain 
why changes in rural poverty occurred largely in parallel with poverty changes in urban areas. 
Developments in the Baltics and the Trans-Caucasus illustrate however that growth did not result 
in rural poverty reductions everywhere. 
(Figure 5 here) 
 Prices: Substantial price changes occurred in some countries.  This was most important 
in Russia and its neighbors after the Russian financial crisis.  The currency devaluations 
following the crisis caused important improvements in competitiveness and in the profitability of 
domestic agricultural producers who saw relative prices rise substantially. For example, in 
Russia, the grain-over-fertilizer price ratio, which had fallen by around 80% in the early 1990s, 
increased strongly after 1998. Figure 5 shows that agricultural prices increased on average more 
than 20% (relative to inflation) in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.
24 After reaching their lowest 
levels in 1998, output and yields rebounded (figure 6). In Tajikistan, agricultural terms of trade 
also improved, as the cessation of the conflict decreased transportation difficulties and stable 
exchange rates favored agriculture. The increase in real prices in agriculture probably 
contributed to a reduction in rural poverty in these countries. In contrast, relative prices declined 
in the same period in the Central European countries and the Baltics, which can help explain the 
more modest gains – and even some set-backs - in rural poverty reduction. Terms of trade also 
declined in Armenia, because of trade disruptions with neighboring countries and frictions in 
domestic markets (Spoor, 2004), possibly explaining why rural poverty declines there were 
small, despite substantial GDP growth. 
(Figure 6 here) 
Access to markets and infrastructure: There were substantial improvements in access to 
markets and infrastructure, in particular in the higher income countries, for two reasons. First, 
higher general incomes and tax revenues induced an improvement in public rural infrastructure 
investments. Second, the most advanced countries in the transition process attracted large   15
amounts of private foreign direct investment in industry and also in the food sector, with large 
positive spillover effects on agriculture (Swinnen, 2007).  In these countries, investments in the 
food industry and agribusiness induced contracting and vertical integration with farms, which 
has helped to overcome market imperfections (Dries and Swinnen, 2004).  In the poorest and 
least advanced countries private and public investment in rural areas has been limited.  This has 
contributed to continued constrained access to input and output markets. Deteriorated rural 
infrastructure continues to limit productivity improvements in agriculture, as well as non-
agricultural employment opportunities.  
 
6.3. Transfers 
Public transfers: Public transfers, such as unemployment benefits and pensions, have 
improved considerably since 1998 due to sustained growth in Central and Eastern Europe and 
new growth further East (Mitra and Yemtsov, 2006). For example, Russia, Kazakhstan and 
Tajikistan benefited from strong growth in government revenues. In Russia and Kazakhstan this 
was partly due to increased incomes from mineral resources, resulting in a drastic improvement 
in the government’s fiscal situation. In Tajikistan, robust growth followed the end of the civil 
war, and increased tax revenues allowed the government to increase social sector spending. In 
several countries, pensions, other social payments, and public sector wages were finally paid (on 
time) and transfers to hospitals, schools, and other organizations improved. The increase in social 
transfers likely helped to reduce poverty in both rural and urban areas. 
Private transfers:  Remittances have increased substantially in many countries in recent 
years (WDI, 2005; EBRD 2006) and continue to play an important role, in particular in some of 
the low-income countries. Part of the private transfers result from the continuation of migration 
waves which started earlier in the 1990s. But there are also new migration trends.  For example, 
the improved economy in Russia after 1998 attracted a new wave of migrants from the poorer 
CIS countries, where remittances have become an important part of rural household budgets 
(Mansoor and Quillin, 2007). 
 
7. Patterns of Rural Poverty Dynamics 
As is clear from the previous sections, the reforms and the institutional and structural 
developments, and their effects have varied tremendously between countries and over time.
25  By   16
comparing the processes that led to changes in rural households’ assets, in returns to their assets, 




Pattern 1: Growth in small-scale labor-intensive agriculture  
In the lowest-income countries – mostly located in southeastern Europe, the Caucasus and 
Central Asia (including Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, and 
Tajikistan), governments distributed land to rural households in physical plots, enabling rural 
households to cope with the negative shock of transition by shifting to self-employed labor-
intensive agriculture.  The process of land distribution was followed by a strong fragmentation of 
farm structures, effectively rapidly shifting land from large-scale former collective farms to 
household farms during difficult times.   
Direct access to land and household farming led to shifts towards labor-intensive crops 
(horticulture) and livestock production. Rapid and strong productivity gains followed, and likely 
led to increases in household incomes.  Figure 6 shows that output and yields grew much 
stronger in the group of countries that followed this pattern.  This path has strong commonalities 
with the Chinese path of agrarian reform and growth.
27   
  This process did not emerge at the start of transition in all these countries, as many 
governments initially resisted it, typically favoring large-scale farming. In several cases, a crisis 
or broader political changes triggered radical policy reforms – as had happened in China in 1978. 
This was the case in Albania in 1990 when food shortages triggered rural revolts and 
spontaneous de-collectivization, in Armenia and Georgia in the early 1990s following natural 
disasters and war, and in Azerbaijan and Moldova in the late 1990s after political changes. 
  The countries with strong fragmentation of farm structures following land distribution 
have relatively small (and sometimes positive) differences between urban and rural headcounts.  
This suggests that land access has helped mitigate rural poverty, even if growth in agriculture 
was hampered by low access to services and infrastructure. Moreover, with opportunities outside 
of the agricultural sector being limited, a relatively young and dynamic labor force has turned to 
family farming on the newly acquired land.  
The demographic characteristics of the rural areas are arguably favorable for future 
growth perspectives, in part because land access triggered urban-to-rural migration by   17
unemployed and food-insecure urban households.  The land-individualization process typically 
coincided with inflows and absorption of labor into agriculture. During the early years of the 
land reform in these countries, agriculture’s share in GDP increased and contributed more than 
50% of GDP, suggesting it acted as a safety net for an otherwise collapsing economy. 
  Finally, in several of the low-income countries (such as Albania, Moldova, Tajikistan) 
international migration plays an important role in increasing rural (and urban) household’s 




Pattern 2: Large-scale agriculture-led productivity growth with major employment 
reductions but good social security.   
An entirely different adjustment pattern has been followed by the higher-income countries of 
Central Europe (such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia).  These countries had a much 
more capital-intensive agriculture and the land restitution process led to a consolidation of large-
scale farm structures and a massive flow of labor out of the agricultural sector.  Large-scale 
privatized farms immediately laid off surplus workers who found jobs in other sectors, became 
unemployed, or went into early retirement.   
Public transfers facilitated this reallocation of labor, as did relatively good access to 
services and infrastructure. The countries in this group had relatively good social benefits and 
pensions, and few people employed in agriculture. This suggests that these higher-income 
countries effectively kept rural poverty - and urban-rural differences - low through social 
transfers, while at the same time benefiting from the productivity gains.  
Productivity growth initially came mainly from major gains in labor productivity on large 
farms, rather than from yield increases, which only started as of the mid 1990s (see figure 6).  
Productivity gains were further enhanced by the inflow of FDI and investment in the food 
industry.  Investment, through vertically coordinated contracting, induced improved access to 
inputs, credit, technology, and markets, even for small household farms (World Bank, 2005).  
This process started earlier in Central Europe, where general economic and institutional reforms 
were advancing faster, than in countries like Romania and Bulgaria (see pattern 3).   18
  Interestingly, in some of the countries where major labor outflows took place, the 
remaining agricultural labor force seems less disadvantaged in terms of human capital.
29 Also, 
international migration only plays a minimal role in those countries.  
After 1998, these countries witnessed lower growth rates and terms of trade in agriculture 
decreased. Yet, with high income levels, rural poverty and rural-urban differences are small, and 
the remaining rural poverty is mainly linked to social exclusion and marginalization of minority 
groups (e.g. Roma).  The benefits from EU accession are further reducing rural poverty.  
 
Pattern 3 : Falling between the cracks in poorer EU accession countries.    
Rural households in the lower-income countries of Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, 
Lithuania), experienced the worst of both situations. Their unemployment and pension payments 
were lower than in the richer central European countries. Where state or collective farms 
dissipated, and the remaining restructured large-scale farms dismissed workers, households had 
to turn to individual farming on restituted land.  As a consequence relatively few people initially 
left farming.
30  
However, as these countries had relatively developed and capital-intensive agricultural 
production systems, productivity gains from shifting to small farms were less than in the poor 
labor intensive agricultural countries (of pattern 1), while the costs in terms of losses of scale 
economies and technology disruptions were larger (see yields in figure 6).
31  With limited access 
to credit, inputs, and technology and few off-farm employment opportunities in rural areas, many 
rural households remained stuck in semi-subsistence farming to complement their incomes and 
with many constraints limiting growth or investments.  
Access to health and education services was severely affected by the collapse of the 
collective farm system.  In addition, there was a dramatic change in the rural population structure 
with a growing share of older, low skilled and less educated people in rural areas.  With 
declining services and off-farm employment opportunities (which also declined with the 
disappearance of the non-agricultural functions of the former collective and state farms) young 
and dynamic people left the rural areas in search for better opportunities in the urban areas, and 
often abroad.   The problem was exacerbated as land restitution concentrated land ownership in 
older households.
32  This constrained access to land for young people but also induced poor   19
elderly urban households, who had no access to sufficient public transfers, to move to rural areas 
to farm their plots for subsistence reasons.  
Further deterioration of agricultural terms of trade after 1998 dampened the potential 
gains of economic growth on rural poverty reduction.  The imbalances in the demographic 
structures of the rural versus urban population can help explain some of the large rural-urban 
poverty differences in these countries, and indicate that prospects for a dynamic rural sector 
might be bleaker – although transfers to rural areas following EU accession should have a 
positive effect on rural poverty reduction in the coming years.  
 
Pattern 4:  Delayed restructuring in the 1990s and externally driven recovery in the 2000s 
in the middle-income CIS countries.  
In the middle income CIS (Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine), large-scale farms continued to play an 
important role for rural employment. The implementation of the land reforms allowed farm 
managers to keep control of the land as the privatization processes were slow and implemented 
through distribution of shares, which was instrumental in keeping the large farm structures in 
place. Continued soft budget constraints prevented the farms’ bankruptcies. This resulted in the 
partial maintenance of the social functions of these large-scale farms, but simultaneously it was 
an impeding factor for productivity gains. This might help explain why rural-urban differences 
are larger for income than for non-income poverty in Russia and Kazakhstan.  
Wage arrears initially contributed to rural poverty, and household plots provided a 
crucial, though limited, income source. Land access to household plots played a buffer role even 
in these countries.  E.g. in Russia, there was a substantial net inflow of population into rural 
areas in 1992 (Bogdanovskii, 2005).
33 In Ukraine and Uzbekistan, where no large-scale de-
collectivization had occurred at that time, household plots accounted for more than 25% of rural 
incomes.  In Russia and Kazakhstan, households produced more than half of agricultural output 
by the end of the 1990s (Lerman et al, 2004). 
  Still, rural-urban poverty differences are large and exacerbated by large differences in 
human capital.  Individuals with higher human capital migrated from the rural areas to urban 
areas, leaving the rural areas disproportionately populated with older and less educated 
individuals.    20
  More recently, poverty has been reduced substantially following strong economic growth 
and improvements in government tax revenues and in agricultural terms of trade.  This was 
particularly true for Russia and Kazakhstan, countries that benefited from increased mineral and 
energy prices. Rural households have benefited from increased public transfers and from an 
increase in public investments in infrastructure and a decline in wage and payment arrears. At the 
same time, improved competitiveness of farms and investments by private companies in 
agribusiness, food and other rural enterprises, as well as increased vertical coordination in the 
farm sector, all might have contributed to rural poverty reduction. 
 
8.  Conclusions and Implications for Poverty Reduction Policies 
This paper has described rural poverty changes and rural-urban poverty differences in the 
transition countries of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, both before and after 1998. 
Through a comparative analysis of the different transition experiences in these countries, it has 
shed light on a set of hypotheses that help explain the different patterns in rural-urban poverty 
dynamics. Research aimed at rigorous testing of the possible underlying causal relationships will 
be key to shed further light on the challenges and opportunities for rural poverty reduction in the 
region.  The policy lessons of this paper are therefore necessarily of a general nature, and do not 
attempt to relate to specific interventions. Instead they focus on the differences between rural and 
urban poverty and on the implications of the wide heterogeneity in the structural characteristics 
and processes in the different groups of countries.   
  The poverty trends discussed in this paper suggest that recent poverty reduction looks 
remarkably similar in rural and urban areas. However, there continues to be more poverty in 
rural areas. Indeed, if trends witnessed since 1998 continue, the share of rural poverty in total 
poverty will further increase in the future. This indicates that the focus on rural poverty will be 
essential for overall poverty reduction strategies. Policies that want to attempt to address the 
rural-urban poverty gap necessarily will have to account for the structural disadvantages of rural 
areas, and for the large heterogeneity in transition processes and outcomes that this paper has 
identified.  
Rural poverty is unlikely to decrease unless policies facilitate rural household asset 
accumulation, successfully increase the returns to those assets, or provide sufficient transfers. 
Given that most transition countries have now completed the land privatization process,   21
increasing rural households’ asset base might crucially depend on policies that target human 
capital accumulation. This indicates the potential role of education and health policies 
specifically targeted to the rural poor. More generally, improvements in rural service delivery, 
including education and health services, is needed, in particular given that the quantity and the 
quality of services has declined strongly in rural areas. 
As agriculture remains a major source of income and employment, agricultural growth is 
likely to remain crucial for poverty reduction, in particular in the poorest countries.  Identifying 
and addressing the key imperfections in input and output markets will be essential to enable the 
self-employed farmers to lift themselves out of poverty. Increasing evidence indicates that 
investments in food processing, agribusiness, trade and retail companies can play a role in 
increasing the returns to smallholders’ assets, as it allows to upgrade the quality of their 
products, and facilitates access to input and output markets. Successes in Central Europe indicate 
that the productivity gains from such investments can be substantial. 
  In the middle-income countries where a larger share of rural households relies on non-
agricultural income, the integration of labor and capital markets in (backward and remote) rural 
areas with the rest of the economy might be the most effective mechanism to increase the returns 
to existing households assets.  The integration of the rural poor in the labor markets, either 
through rural off-farm employment generation or by improving access to urban labor markets is 
likely to be key for sustained and equitable income growth in many transition countries.  
  Yet, the human capital disadvantages that exist in many rural areas, and in particular the 
disproportionate presence of the older generation in several countries, also suggests that the 
welfare of a large share of rural households will continue to rely on public transfers, and in 
particular pensions, for a number of years to come.  
   The rapid changes that occurred during transition, and the widely diverging rural-urban 
poverty outcomes that resulted, offers a unique opportunity to analyze rural-urban poverty 
differences. The lessons that can be derived from this analysis carry relevance beyond the region, 
as well-designed and targeted rural policies and programs are key to address increasing tensions 
regarding rural-urban inequalities in many parts of the world. The analysis in this paper suggests 
that policies that affect rural households asset base or the returns to those assets, as well as 
transfers, can all be crucial for rural welfare. Our analysis also indicates that the outcome of such 
policies depend on initial income levels, taxation, and factor intensity in agriculture. These   22
findings entail broad implications for the design of poverty reduction policies and programs for 
rural areas in other developing and transition economies. 
                                                 
1 “Transition” refers here to the process of transformation that the economies of these countries underwent in the 
shift from a centrally planned to a market economy. 
2  Alam et al. (2005) have analyzed the general poverty changes in the post-1998 period.  They show that poverty 
has decreased after 1999 in almost all countries in the region and emphasize the crucial role of economic growth.  
3 As argued elsewhere (Macours and Swinnen, 2002) many of the reform choices were themselves endogenous and 
can be traced back to the initial conditions at the onset of the transition process.  This paper does not aim at 
identifying causality but rather describes general patterns of rural-urban poverty differences in transition countries 
within the constraints of the available data.  
4 Examples of such studies include Muravyev (2006) and Vranken et al. (2007). 
5 All headcount indices were calculated based on consumption aggregates from national representative household 
level surveys (household budget surveys or household living standard measurement surveys). The consumption 
aggregates were constructed from the unit record data. The same set of rules and definitions was applied for all 
countries, with regard to which components enter the aggregate, adjustments for regional price differences, 
imputation of monetary values for home production, and cleaning for outliers. As a result, differences across 
countries in the final consumption (and therefore poverty) measure are due to differences in primary data, not due to 
differences in aggregation. Differences in primary data (e.g. questionnaire design) could help explain why the 
absolute poverty levels in Azerbaijan appear low. For more information regarding the methods used to guarantee 
comparability across and within countries, and on the datasets used, we refer to the appendix in Alam et al. (2005). 
6 While questionnaires from different countries use different recall periods for consumption, or ask more or less 
details about different items that are part of general consumption categories (e.g. food, education, housing), data 
from rural and urban area within a country are derived from the same survey and questionnaires. As a result, 
comparing rural with urban poverty allows to factor out some of these differences across countries.  
7 While comparative data is not available for some higher-income countries in Central Europe (Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Slovenia) data from previous studies based on the national poverty lines show very low levels of 
poverty (less than 3%) as early as 1996 (World Bank, 2000).    23
                                                                                                                                                             
8 The rural-urban ratio based on relative shares in the poorest quintiles show somewhat smaller differences for 
Kazakhstan and Russia.   
9 For Georgia, the various indicators are less consistent.  
10 In Poland and Lithuania, poverty increased slightly. More exceptionally, in Latvia rural poverty increased 
significantly. See data on changes at the country-level in table A1 in the appendix. 
11 Alam et al. (2005) point out, however, that poverty reduction in capital cities has been stronger than in secondary 
cities and rural areas, especially in the CIS. 
12 While figure 1 does not include a Central Asian country because data is not available for the whole 1998-2002 
period, the trends over shorter periods in each of these countries show that rural and urban poverty moved in the 
same direction (see table A1). 
13 This striking pattern can be reconciled with the parallel developments demonstrated in figure 1 and 2, by looking 
at the urban and rural poverty rates in 1998. Overall poverty was lower in middle-income countries than in low-
income countries, but the gap between rural and urban poverty was larger, and as a consequence similar percentage 
point declines led to a widening in the differences between urban and rural poverty between the 2 sets of countries. 
This reinforces our argument that rural-urban differences in 1998/99 are key to understand the changes in more 
recent years.   
14 As in the standard household models by Singh, et al. (1986). See also de Janvry and Sadoulet (2006) for a recent 
review of this literature.  
15 Subsistence farming, in which rural households cultivate mainly for food security reasons, and with production 
often uniquely destined for home consumption, increased drastically during transition (see also Seeth et al., 1998). 
16 Several studies have shown high and increasing returns to education in transition countries (e.g. Campos and 
Joliffe, 2002; Munich et al. 2005; Fleisher et al., 2005). 
17 Unemployment or underemployment is high in many rural areas. While rural/urban unemployment ratios should 
be interpreted with caution because of reporting differences linked to the possibility of unemployment benefits, and 
to the occurrence of underemployment in rural areas by people working tiny household plots, the available data 
suggest that rural unemployment is particularly high in Bulgaria and Russia.    24
                                                                                                                                                             
18 Belarus provides an important exception as price and trade reforms have been modest, and extensive subsidies of 
agriculture are continuing. As such it provides an interesting benchmark case. In fact, it stands out for having low 
levels of rural poverty and small rural-urban differences. 
19  See Macours and Swinnen (2000). 
20 In many countries, former collectives or state farms were also active in other activities, and as such provided non-
agricultural employment, which disappeared with restructuring. The overall changes in rural off-farm employment, 
and the impacts on rural poverty, remain however unclear, in part because of the many informal self-employment or 
wage jobs.  
21 For example, less than 10% of households have a water connection in Romania, Moldova and Kazakhstan; and 
the share of rural households without telephone connection is as high as 97% in Albania, 94% in Tajikistan, and 
91% in Georgia (World Bank, 2004a).  
22 See Carletto et al. (2006) for evidence from Albania. Higher private transfers might also reflect more intra-family 
transfers within urban areas that could be explained by the fact that, due to space constraints, members of an 
extended household might be less likely to live under the same roof. 
23Nevertheless, as in Albania, external migration by the younger generation might possibly explain why – despite 
land distribution - rural poverty remains higher than urban.  
24 We present output prices deflated with CPI instead of relative input prices indices, for lack of the later. This is 
however unlikely to affect the interpretation since most large shocks in input prices occurred in the beginning of 
transition, when subsidies were cut.  
25  The reasons behind the differences in policy choices, i.e. the political economy of the land reforms, are discussed 
in Swinnen (1999) and Swinnen and Rozelle (2006). 
26  This list of patterns is not conclusive and some countries may not fit in. For instance, agriculture in Poland and 
the successor states of Yugoslavia was dominated by individual farms already prior to transition, and land reforms 
therefore did not play a major role.  
27 The paths are not identical since the Chinese land reforms only distributed use rights, and not ownership rights on 
land. Moreover, as discussed, the Chinese reforms coincided with major increases in agricultural terms of trade 
(Macours and Swinnen, 2002).      25
                                                                                                                                                             
28  The effect of the latter depends on whether migration is temporary rather than permanent. At least in Albania a 
large share of migration tends to be temporary (Germenji and Swinnen, 2005). 
29 For example, in Estonia, where agricultural employment declined by around 60% in the 1990s, only 19% of 
agricultural employment is 55 years or older, compared to 13% of the workforce in construction. Also with respect 
to the level of education, the inter-sectoral differences are small in Estonia. This contrasts with, e.g. Slovenia and 
Poland where no such labor restructuring occurred and those employed in agriculture are on average much older and 
less educated than in other blue-collar sectors of the economy (Swinnen and Dries, 2004).   
30 In Lithuania and Latvia, the positive trend in agricultural employment reversed around 1997. 
31 See Lerman, et al. (2004) for a discussion of market imperfections and power politics that help explain the 
possible advantages of large(r) farms in a transition context. 
32 For example in Romania, a large share of the “farming population” consists of households older than 65 who used 
to work on collective farms. As collective farm workers pensions are only 25% of state pensions – themselves low 
by international standards – they are forced to farm for survival. As a consequence, the employment rate of people 
between 60 and 75 years of age is more than 40% among the rural population and around 5% among the urban 
population (Swinnen and Dries, 2004). 
33 Interestingly, this temporary inflow of labor into rural areas in the wake of an economic shock is similar to 
migration patterns observed after the East Asian crisis (see e.g. Frankenberg, et al. 2003 for evidence on Indonesia).    26
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Table 1: Rural income and non-income poverty and rural/urban poverty differences
P0 % in lowest quintile
rural rural/urban rural/urban rural/urban rural rural/urban
Czech Rep - - - - 4.0 1.03
Hungary 0.3 1.0 1.62 1.43 7.6 1.10
Poland 3.2 1.4 2.34 2.27 8.5 0.92
S l o v a k i a -- -- 8 . 0 1 . 1 0
Albania 27.1 1.5 1.47 1.54 - -
Bulgaria 16.6 1.6 3.82 2.04 16.9 1.41
Romania 24.4 3.0 2.33 2.63 19.8 1.37
Estonia 5.0 1.2 - - 5.0 0.83
Latvia 4.0 1.9 2.55 - 12.9 1.59
Lithuania 8.8 4.5 - 2.44 9.7 1.43
Armenia 50.9 0.9 0.74 0.74 14.2 0.85
Azerbaijan 4.8 0.9 0.76 0.65 14.2 1.28
Georgia 55.6 1.3 0.84 0.90 10.4 0.59
Belarus 1.9 0.8 - 1.47 10.2 1.46
Moldova 60.6 1.3 1.48 2.29 14.6 0.97
Russia 13.7 2.0 1.94 1.75 19.0 1.17
Ukraine 3.7 1.3 1.07 - 11.4 1.01
Kazakhstan 35.4 1.9 2.13 1.75 15.7 0.87
Kyrgyz Republic 79.5 1.3 1.38 1.64 18.0 0.64
Tajikistan 76.4 1.1 1.09 1.25 - -
Uzbekistan 46.9 1.4 1.36 1.45 17.1 0.80
Bosnia & Herzegovina 4.6 1.0 1.44 1.45
Croatia - - 1.74 - 7.9 1.23
Kosovo - - 1.09 1.11 - -
Macedonia 4.5 1.1 2.52 - 9.8 0.93
Serbia and Montenegro 9.1 2.2 1.82 1.56 - -
Sources: 
P0 for 2002 (2001 for Bulgaria and Bosnia, and 2003 for Tajikistan) using international poverty line at 2.15 US$ (2000PPP): Alam et al. (2005)
P0 for latest year available according to national poverty line: World Bank: various Poverty Assesments
% of population in the national lowest income quintile in 2000-02: World Bank (2004a)
Infant mortality (number of deaths per 1000 live births) for 2002 (2001 for Georgia and Uzbekistan; 2000 for Armenia; 1999 for Poland and Russia): United Nations 
Statistical Division (2005).
Mortality rate
 (infants under 1 year)
National poverty lines
Headcount ratio (P0)





Table 2: Human Capital Distribution: Age and Education (most recent year available)
% of rural rural/urban % of rural rural/urban % or rural rural/total
population ratio population ratio population ratio
Czech Rep. 22 0.97 14 1.04 - -
Hungary 21 0.94 15 1.04 81 1.28
Poland 21 1.02 13 1.17 77 1.36
Slovenia 22 1.02 15 1.00 - -
Albania - - - - 74 1.26
Bulgaria 17 0.76 25 1.89 66 1.75
R o m a n i a 2 10 . 8 7 1 81 . 7 0 - -
E s t o n i a 1 90 . 8 9 1 61 . 0 3 - -
Latvia 20 0.97 15 0.97 - -
L i t h u a n i a 1 90 . 8 3 1 81 . 4 1 4 91 . 6 4
B e l a r u s 1 80 . 7 9 2 32 . 4 2 4 51 . 7 9
M o l d o v a 1 90 . 7 9 1 11 . 4 4 2 41 . 4 4
Russia 20 0.89 14 1.25 39 1.47
U k r a i n e 1 90 . 8 6 1 81 . 5 9 - -
A r m e n i a 2 41 . 0 6 1 01 . 0 7 2 91 . 2 8
Azerbaijan 24 1.02 7 1.13 25 1.23
G e o r g i a 2 10 . 9 2 1 61 . 3 4 2 81 . 5 5
Kazakhstan 20 0.81 6 0.87 28 1.27
Kyrgyzstan 21 0.83 5 0.92 14 1.35
Tajikistan 20 0.90 3 0.71 33 1.05
Uzbekistan 21 0.89 4 0.71 21 1.03
Bosnia&Herzegovina - - - - 56 1.19
Macedonia 22 0.95 9 1.24 - -
S e r b i a & M o n t e n e g r o 2 11 . 0 2 1 51 . 2 8 6 41 . 5 8
Source: United Nations Statistics Division (2005) and World Bank (2004a)
Population 25-39 Population 65+
Population with less than 
secondary education  33
Figure 1: Average Urban and Rural Poverty 1998-2002* 
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*Averages for Belarus, Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Russia, and Romania  





















Note: see Table A1 for specific time periods.  
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Wage includes both agricultural and non-agricultural wage 
Data derived from household surveys in 2002 for Albania, Romania, 2001 for Bulgaria and Azerbaijan, 1998/99 for 
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan,  
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Agriculture Wage Nonagr. self- employed Social transfers Private transfers Other  35
















Central European EU accession countries shows average for Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia,  
Poorer EU accession countries shows average for Bulgaria, Romania, and Lithuania 
Middle-income CIS shows average for Russia, and Ukraine 
Source: Macours and Swinnen (2002) 
 
 

















Middle-income CIS shows average for Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine 
Low-income CIS shows average for Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova;  
Central European EU accession countries shows average for Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia,  
Poorer EU accession countries shows average for Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania 











































































































Poorer EU accession   


































a Average changes for typical countries within each pattern: Low income CIS = Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan; Central European EU accession countries = Czech Rep., Slovakia, Hungary, 
Estonia; Poorer EU accession countries = Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania;    Middle income CIS = Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan 
Source: Macours and Swinnen (2002); FAO (2004), ILO (2004), CIS statistics (2003) 
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Appendix: Additional data on rural and urban poverty changes post 1998. 
 
Table A1: GDP growth and urban and rural poverty changes after 1999 (annual change)
GDP urban poverty rural poverty
period % point % point % point
Hungary 1999-2002 4.2 -0.2 -0.4
Poland 1999-2002 2.3 0.4 0.1
Romania 1999-2002 3.4 -1.2 -1.0
Estonia 2000-2002 7.6 0.1 -0.3
Latvia 2002-2003 8.2 -0.2 1.3
Lithuania 1999-2002 5.6 0.0 0.7
Armenia 1999-2002 10.2 -1.6 -0.3
Azerbaijan 2002-2003 11.2 0.0 -2.2
Georgia 1999-2002 6.5 -1.5 1.2
Belarus 1999-2002 5.5 -1.9 -1.3
Moldova 1999-2002 3.0 -7.2 -8.2
Russia 1999-2002 6.2 -4.4 -3.4
Ukraine 2002-2003 9.1 -1.8 -1.9
Kazakhstan 2001-2003 10.3 -5.2 -4.2
Kyrgyz Republic 2000-2003 3.1 -3.7 -2.2
Tajikistan 1999-2003 11.1 -4.6 -4.0
Uzbekistan 2000-2003 4.1 -3.2 -1.9
Bosnia & Herzegovina 2001-2004 4.0 -0.2 0.0
Macedonia 2002-2003 3.1 0.6 -1.1
Source: World Development Indicators (2005) and Alam et al. (2005)  38
 
Table A2: Access to services
Water connection Electricity access Telephone connection
% HH with access % of HH with 24hour access % of HH with access
Rural Rural/total Rural Rural/total Rural Rural/total
Hungary 2000 88.9 0.94 74.7 0.93
Poland 2001 91.7 0.95 62.4 0.81
Albania 2002 23.6 0.44 7.2 0.50 2.6 0.11
Bulgaria 2001 96.3 0.98 96.0 0.99 59.5 0.79
Romania 2002 8.4 0.16
Lithuania 2000 38.7 0.52 52.3 0.69
Armenia 2001 64.0 0.78 44.0 0.71
Azerbaijan 2001 17.1 0.31 18.4 0.48
Georgia 2001 71.4 0.87 11.6 0.54 8.8 0.25
Belarus 2001 44.5 0.58 47.8 0.68
Moldova 2001 2.4 0.07 25.0 0.58
Russia 2001 46.3 0.58 25.6 0.49
Kazakhstan 2001 7.8 0.15 42.8 0.74 19.7 0.46
Kyrgyz. Rep 2001 16.8 0.42 26.2 0.62 12.8 0.46
Tajikistan 1999 30.7 0.66 12.9 0.67 5.4 0.39
Turkmenistan 1998 19.8 0.40 39.7 0.92 14.4 0.41
Uzbekistan 2000 26.7 0.50 6.8 0.27
Bosnia-Herzegovina 2001 63.7 0.82 86.5 0.99 69.1 0.96
Kosovo 2000 21.7 0.42 8.2 0.38 20.1 0.50
Serbia 2002 79.2 0.88 58.2 0.78
Source: World Bank (2004a)  39
Figure A1:  Rural and urban head count ratios between 1998 and 2002 by country 
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Figure A2: Ratio of rural versus urban poverty in 1999 and 2002
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a: changes for 2000-2002 for Kyrgyz Republic and 2001-2003 for Kazakhstan 
Source: own calculations based on data from Alam et al. (2005) 
 
 
 